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Introduction 
Ever since the post-cold war era security studies have taken a whole new turn that challenge the old 
realist paradigm that foresaw a never-ending conflict between states for raw relative gains in an 
anarchical system dominated by military studies. This paradigm has been challenged since the 
opposite has happened: Democracy continues to spread, policy-makers have engaged in peace 
promotion in international institutions and states have formed alliances in international institutions, 
organizations and regional communities. Concurrently, new security theories have been developed 
that all explain the absence of war in different terms by focusing more or less on material structures 
(Adler, Barnett 1998: 10). One of these puzzles is that EU in 2012 won the Nobel peace prize as a 
result of interstate peace in over 70 years, which is remarkable given Europe’s long history of 
conflict and violence. In this sense the EU constitutes a complex puzzle for many theorists because 
of its uniqueness in international politics.  
This project attempts to contribute with insights to this puzzle. Drawing on Adler and Barnett’s 
theory of security communities, I approach the complex subject of security in international politics 
from the theoretical perspective of security communities and aim to understand both how and why 
the EU security community operates in its wider regional neighborhood to maintain stability and 
security. In order to do so, I have selected the security cooperation between Turkey and EU as a 
case to uncover how EU governs security in its wider regional neighborhood.  
By attempting to uncover the underlying security reasoning, patterns of practices and discourses 
that reveal how EU governs its security, this study suggest that the close proximity between EU and 
Turkey, given its latest enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, has presented new 
opportunities as well as challenges. It is suggested that EU’s involvement with Turkey can be seen 
in terms of an interest in stabilizing its regional neighborhood in terms of border security. While it 
is also argued that a “driving factor” in this case is the desire to overcome another overlapping 
security concern of Russian energy dependency that has proved troublesome since the Ukranian-
Russian gas crisis in 2006 and 2009. It is therefore suggested that EU’s involvement with Turkey 
has to do with the EU security community’s objectives of peace promotion, governing security in its 
neighborhood and energy security concerns. It is based on the fact that Turkey’s geopolitical 
location is close to some of the proven largest energy reserves, and due to an assessment that EU 
and Turkey both have a lot to gain from such a relationship. 
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What is particularly interesting in this case is how a security community operates to secure peaceful 
outcomes in an otherwise instable conflictive neighborhood close to Turkey, which may spill-over 
to the EU if not handled correctly. Moreover, how does Europe deal with the many involved actors 
including Russia who stands to potentially lose its gas influence on its most important energy 
importing EU partner? Given the differences between Turkey and EU including: relative size; 
unsolved regional disputes; lack of Western democratic reforms; troubling neighborhood and 
potentially advantageous geopolitical location how can EU handle its energy security problem and 
secure peaceful outcomes? This project suggest we must look to the security community practices, 
security community building and influence of the Turkey EU-accession to understand how the EU 
security community conducts its neighborhood security policies in the case of Turkey-EU security 
cooperation.   
 
Problem statement: I argue that EU-Turkey security-cooperation best can be understood as a 
matter of overlapping security concerns that is slowing the process of integration Turkey into the 
EU security community, and may, therefore, cause a barrier for the EU energy security problem 
(diversifying gas energy imports in order to secure cheap reliable suppliers).   
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Methods 
 
In this chapter I describe the scientific methods used to analyze EU security dilemmas in the 
Turkey-EU accession. The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodological outlook 
and methods used to analyze EU security dilemmas in the Turkey-EU accession. 
I have chosen a specific case study method to analyze security community practices between 
Turkey and EU in the Caspian region. The case study is about EU-Turkey cooperation of regional 
security governance in the Caspian region since the Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 that has increased 
the EU awareness of the vital importance of energy security (Finon 2011: 47).  
My main argument for choosing single-case study as a method is that it is compatible with my 
chosen theory of security communities that prescribes an interpretative approach and derives from a 
constructivist perspective. In this sense, my case study is chosen to contribute with a qualitative 
interpretative and nuanced view of security studies that analyzes the development of security 
politics in terms of a constructivist understanding.  
This is compatible with my chosen theory of security communities that, in short, argues that 
security politics today are formed by “security cooperation” in international socially constructed 
communities that share identities and mutual trust, and work together to secure dependable 
expectations of peaceful outcomes. It also supplements the theoretical perspective of security 
overlaps that provides a multiperspectival framework to understand regional security governance in 
empirical practice, where analyzing overlaps becomes a research object in its own right (Adler and 
Greve 2009:59-63).  
To explain what methods I used in the project I also pay attention to the limitations of the project, 
delimitation, empirical data gathering, and critically reflect on the added scientific value of my 
research.  
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Constructivism 
 
In order to conceptualize how “security” is perceived and analyzed, it is important to first reflect on 
what implications the choice of a constructivist perspective has on how we view societal matters 
and social interaction in terms of security politics. This section will therefore attempt to evaluate the 
main characteristics of constructivism, which will be used to categorize the theory of security 
communities by Adler and Barnett and reflect on the implications for the study of “security”.  
Central to constructivism is the understanding that social reality is not viewed as an objective entity 
separate from human knowledge; it is, instead, socially constructed and formed by our 
epistemological understanding of it. Constructivism view societal phenomenon’s societal reality as 
shaped by sociological interaction and historical processes that has important implications for how 
knowledge is acquired scientifically (epistemologically subject/object), but also ontologically, in the 
sense that constructivist view individual and societal reality as socially constructed and as 
dependent on our collective understanding of it. In this sense, the societal reality consists of 
intertwined relationship between knowledge and practice that continuously forms how reality is 
constructed, which consequently means that to constructivists’ social reality is in a state of change 
(Rasborg in Fuglsang & Olsen 2009: 349 & 352-353).   
It follows that the nature of individuals are not shaped by a predetermining nature (anti-
essentialism); that our epistemological understanding of reality does not constitute an objective 
interpretation of reality, but is, instead, shaped by the social, cultural and historical context. 
Moreover, constructivism emphasize language not just as a central way of social interaction that 
shapes how we think about the world, but also as an action in itself where “saying something 
becomes equivalent to doing something” (Rasborg in Fuglsang & Olsen 2009: 351-352).  
 
Case study 
In this section I outline how I will use case study as a method to answer my problem formulation 
using George & Bennett (2005) understanding of case studies. 
George & Bennett define a case study as “an instance of a class of events” where events refer to a 
phenomenon that the researcher choose to investigate in order to “develop theory (or generic 
knowledge) regarding causes of similarities and differences about the instances (cases) of that class 
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of events (George & Bennett, 2005: 17-18). By this they mean that a case study is a specific 
historical defined episode that the researcher delves into analysing and understanding in order to 
generate knowledge or theoretical insights to a historical phenomenon.  In order to structure this 
section and explain how I use the case study to answer my problem formulation I draw upon 
George and Bennett’s two case study questions: “what is this event a case of?” and “is this event a 
designated phenomenon?”, which questions they argue are essential to case-study research, design 
and implementation (George & Bennett, 2005: 18). 
What is this event a case of? 
The event in this particular case is the Caspian region since the Russian-Ukrainian crisis began in 
2006 until November 5. 2013 when EU-Turkey negotiations reopened after a three year break.  
The event is chosen as a case of how the EU security community operates to supplement the first 
part of the analysis (EU-Turkey security cooperation) with an in-depth case study of EU-Turkey 
energy security in the Nabucco project (second analysis part). Both analysis parts can, however, be 
seen as two supplementing “empirical cases” contributing to the bigger picture, that is, how the EU 
security community operates and governs security.  
The case study (second analysis part) is limited to the Nabucco project specifically. It is selected in 
order to uncover the underlying security mechanisms of regional security governance from an EU 
security community perspective. This is done by analysing security governance in terms of 
“security overlaps” in discourse and practice between EU and Turkey’s energy security cooperation 
in the Caspian region.  
 
Caspian region a case of regional security governance and security overlaps 
My main assumption in terms of EU’s security governance and cooperation involvement with 
Turkey is that there exist security overlap between regional security governance (energy security, 
border security, regional governance) and internal security, which has essential implications for 
how the EU security community governs its security. In the analysis I claim that this security 
overlap is represented in terms of Turkey-EU security cooperation in the EU-accession and 
Nabucco project, which I see as a main EU security community dilemma:  
On one hand, EU is interested in diversifying its energy suppliers due to a growing concern of 
Russian energy dependency; a position that Turkey geographically has a key position to overcome 
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as an “EU Bridge or energy hub” through its access to energy rich areas including the 
Mediterranean, Caspian Sea and Central Asia. This altogether argues for integration Turkey into the 
EU security community. On the other hand, EU is concerned with the integration path and 
extending its borders and taking up Turkey’s “regional problems”, since the internal stability and 
security of the EU is dependent on the control of borders to overcome what has been called 
“globalization” problems of migration, terrorism (9/11), corruption, organized crime and 
trafficking.  
The dilemmas thus illustrate a conflict between two choices of the EU security community: 
On one hand, if the EU security community insists on leaving out an energy treaty and special 
conditions for Turkey it will slow the accession process considerably, and may directly be a 
hindrance to an EU security objectives of regional governance and a unified energy policy in the 
Caspian region if the Turkey-EU accession fails. Thus, leaving the issue of Russian gas monopoly 
in Central and Eastern Europe unsolved (Finon 2011: 48-50).  
On the other hand, if EU chooses to take the path of fast integration then Turkey’s lack of border 
security and regional instability can become a liability to the internal security of the EU. Thus, if 
EU focuses on solving accession negotiations fast with special conditions it would help the energy 
cooperation, but also create border security risks as EU would extend its borders to Turkey’s 
instable neighborhood. The dilemma is thus whatever path EU chooses to take (fast or slow 
integration). Both choices can potentially have serious implications for regional security governance 
and therefore become a liability to internal security (border or energy security).In this sense, EU 
seems to have chosen the slow integration approach for now and thereby attempted to separate 
energy from Turkish-EU accession. Europe (Finon 2011: 50).  
 
EU-Turkey in the Caspian region (driving security factors and barriers)  
In line with the above points, I argue the case of Turkey-EU cooperation in the Caspian-South 
Caucasus region represents a case of driving security factors and barriers in the Turkey-EU 
accession. I see energy security is a driving factor for the Turkey-EU accession in that Turkey’s 
geopolitical key position can prove significant for EU to overcome its energy security problem, 
where Turkey, as a part of EU, could fulfill a unique role in solving EU’s vital energy security 
problem.  
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I see border security as a barrier that is primarily about the internal risk if EU’s borders were to 
extent to Turkey’s troubling neighborhood.   
According to Karen Smith, the concerns of extending borders go back to the essential dilemma of 
EU enlargement and neighborhood policy since the post-cold-era, as she argues, involves the 
essential dilemma of the question: “How large should the EU be?” (Karen Smith 2005: 757) In this 
way she outlines the dilemma of EU enlargement in terms of choice between inclusion and 
exclusion: “Inclusion means bridging the old Cold War divide and uniting a continent, but could up 
shredding the carefully woven fabric of the Union itself. Exclusion means isolating countries that 
can ill afford isolation, and making a mockery of the very term European Union” (Karen Smith 
2005: 757). Moreover, she states that, since the 2004 enlargement, EU has a closer proximity to 
Russia and neighboring countries that has created an immediate need to stabilize externally in order 
to ensure that “the risk of instability spilling over into the larger EU” (Karen Smith 2005: 758) and 
further states that: “the extension of EU’s borders is ‘the most important of all the policy 
implications of EU enlargement” (Karen Smith 2005: 758).  
The reason why extending borders are important is therefore because such actions lead to new 
security mechanisms, and may cause security governance problems since EU inherits Turkey’s 
domestic and foreign (regional) unsolved conflicts. 
Is this case a designated phenomenon?  
The case does represent a designated phenomenon that can be identified due its defined area, its 
regional special circumstances and context-bound context in time and space. However, it has been 
selected to illustrate a particular phenomenon; namely the strategically important position the region 
has for EU to overcome energy security problems. The case is narrowed to the specific Turkey-EU 
regional security cooperative foreign policy objectives and operations in the Caspian region with 
special focus on the Nabucco project in a specific time frame 2006-2013 (November the fifth).  
The results and analysis can be used to explain “a contextual part” of how security concerns have an 
effect on enlargement accession negotiations in practice, and what dynamics, human behavior and 
security mechanisms that shape regional security governance in a security community. Although I 
recognize that my research is contextually bound, it may in its specific single-case nature be able to 
uncover many interpretations, analysis, and perspectives that can be transferred on to other related 
case work on security community overlaps and enlargement, thus contributing with a particular case 
that complements a broader security study literature. Although case study and a constructivist 
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approach may have disadvantages in terms of generality and developing predictable non-context 
depend knowledge, it may contribute with in-depth analysis of specifics that includes nuances, 
patterns and varieties. In this sense I subscribe to Flyvbjerg view that: “Social science has not 
succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final instance 
nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge. And the case study is especially 
well suited to produce this knowledge.” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 223). 
Caspian region and EU – an overview of the energy problem  
In terms of energy supply, EU is already the World’s biggest gas importing market, which demand 
is expected to increase 1.6 % per year from 2010 to 2030 that, according to the International Energy 
Agency, is expected to rise from 187 bcm in 2000 to 632 bcm in 2030, a 449-bcm/y increase 
(Robertson 2004: 99). EU’s main gas imports gas is from Algeria (14%), Russia (35%) and Norway 
(about 35 %) (Ratner 2013 et al.: 6). However, despite having Norway as an internal supplier
1
, EU 
is expected to rely mainly on external imports since its internal supplies of gas are expected to 
decrease. This represents a big challenge for EU that is dependent on few major energy suppliers, 
including Russian gas import dependency that is seen as a security threat, which, ever since the 
Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis, has increased EU energy security awareness. Accordingly, most 
Central East European countries are dependent on Russian gas. This renders EU energy security a 
top priority, which has led EU to develop a common foreign policy objective lead by the 
Commission to diversify energy suppliers (Ratner 2013 et al.: 1) (Finon 2011: 48-50) (Harks, Enno 
2006: 48).  
The Caucasus (seen as part of the Caspian region in my analysis), and the other surrounding regions 
of Turkey enables EU to extend its reach to some of the most energy-rich regions on the planet 
equivalent to about 71,8 % of the world total gas reserves, where the Caspian and Central Asia 
combined amounts to about 6.57 trillion cubic metres of gas (Roberts 2004: 98 & 101). The 
problem is, however, that Russia is competing with EU and attempting to block EU-Turkey 
attempts to cooperate and develop a coherent energy strategy in the Caspian region by blocking 
sabotage such attempts (Evin et al. 2010: 17).  
Russia has “sabotaged” EU-Turkey attempts to overcome their energy dependency, not least in 
respect to the Nabucco pipeline plans (the biggest EU-Turkey project to date that extends from 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus through Turkey to the EU) where Russia has made several 
                                                             
1 Norway recognized as an internal supplier in the Green paper 2002 
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attempts to make this project fail, including making contracts with the Italian giant gas company 
ENI to make side energy pipeline projects such as the Blue stream line and others that effectively 
transfer Caspian gas through Russian territory to the EU with the purpose of maintain an energy 
dominance a EU-Turkey dependency (Roberts 2004: 108) (Barysch 2007: 2-4)  
 
Delimitation and limitations 
Due to the space requirements I have decided not to focus on a number of other relevant aspects that 
could have supplemented my research. This includes NATO as a historical important security actor 
in terms of EU enlargement. NATO cooperative security inclusion of partnerships and EU security 
community strategies to extend its community to neighbors is relevant but beyond the scope of this 
project.  
I focus exclusively on foreign policy security governance and exclude thereby internal dynamics of 
EU Member States or Turkish national politics to limit my focus. Thus I focus exclusively on EU-
Turkey security in terms of foreign policy security relations and security governance in the Caspian-
Caucasus region. Moreover, I leave out the historical regional conflicts of Turkey and other disputes 
than that of the Caspian region including, for example, the Cyprus Turkish-Greece conflict.  
Although the Turkey-EU accession talks matter for energy, it is not the accession talks per se that is 
the focus in this project, but its importance for the energy security cooperation and regional security 
governance (Barysch 2007: 6-7). This means effectively that I cannot say that my project provides a 
full picture of the security practices that shape the Turkey-EU accession. I merely attempt to 
understand two aspects of it, which I consider to be of important: namely the relation between a 
driving security motive of Turkey providing EU with energy security as an energy hub to other rich 
energy (oil and gas) destinations, and a central slowing process factor of border security (a case of 
regional security governance), as an accession would effectively enlarge EU borders to Turkey.  
Another limitation lies in the limited literature of security community’s and the lack of vocabulary 
to describe multiperspectival understandings of regional security governance in systems like the EU 
or other security communities for that matter, which means that I had a limited material to build on 
(Adler & Greve 2009: 61). 
Additionally I focus only on gas in terms of EU’s energy security objectives since gas represents a 
mutual dependency problem for EU and Turkey. Moreover, since gas is not as easily transported as 
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oil and more complex, gas energy security represents a more vital security concern (Roberts 2004: 
99)  
Empirical data: 
My research is based mainly on secondary data and consists of numerous scholar articles that I have 
selected in terms of their relevance for my problem orientation, and in terms of whether their 
theoretical orientation fitted with my theoretical framework literature of security communities. The 
articles I used for my theoretical framework is more or less all I could access on the subject, which I 
categorized into two sections of formation of security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998) and 
security governance (Adler and Greve 2009). I selected scholar articles according to cites and peer 
reviews and used their data on energy deals, key numbers, and in accordance to their significance 
for the subject. Additionally, I have used EC reports assessment of the contribution of EU-Turkey 
foreign policy goals and used this as evidence that energy and regional security governance has a 
great significance to the progress of the Turkish accession into the EU. Moreover, I have gathered 
information from a few websites where I took careful notice of both the source reliability and 
seriousness (including experts). 
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Theoretical framework 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline how I will use the theoretical framework of security 
communities to help answer my problem formulation. In order to carry out this task, I have devised 
two set of arguments that the theoretical framework should help contextualize:   
First, I argue that EU has formed a security community based on self-restraint and peace promotion 
that has - as its goal - the objective to spread its security community principles to neighboring 
partners (such as Turkey).  
Secondly, I argue that EU-Turkey security-cooperation best can be understood as a matter of 
overlapping security concerns that is slowing the process of integrating Turkey into the EU security 
community, and may, therefore, cause a barrier for the EU energy security problem (diversifying 
gas energy imports in order to secure cheap reliable suppliers).   
The chapter is divided into two sections. It starts with a general introduction to the theory of 
security communities and concludes with a concrete theoretical apparatus to further analyze the two 
arguments. In the first section I outline the main characteristics of security communities using Adler 
and Barnett’s framework about formation of security communities. In the second section I outline 
the central theoretical concepts that will be used in the analysis - including “security overlaps”, 
“security governance” and “self-restraint”– and link these to more concrete analytical concepts in 
order to analyze security overlaps during Turkey’s accession. I conclude this chapter by 
summarizing the framework in a table and discuss this in terms of the two arguments above. 
Formation of security communities  
Deutsch’s legacy  
In order to explain the pacific development between countries after the cold war, Deutsch (1957) 
was the first to observe the formation of pluralistic security communities that occurred whenever 
states integrated to a point where their sense of community rendered war inside the community 
unimaginable (Adler & Barnett 1998: 3).  
Deutsch differentiated between two types of communities: Pluralistic security communities and 
amalgamated security communities. A pluralistic security community is when states retain their 
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legal sovereign independence, whereas amalgamated security communities can be defined as the 
formation of two states (or more) who formally unify into a single larger unit or a centralized 
government (Adler & Barnett 1997: 255). Pluralistic security community occurs when states form 
core values in institutions where a shared responsiveness, mutual identity and loyalty exists, and 
where states are integrated to a point that they entertain dependable expectations of peaceful 
outcomes (Adler & Barnett 1998: 7).  
Deutsch explained the formation of pluralistic security communities as a result of: First, 
transnational interactions that encouraged community building where shared meanings, values and 
identities exist; and secondly, the impact of these international communities on state’s security 
politics and integration into pluralistic security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998: 4).  
Deutsch stressed the importance of communication, and the technological development, as a central 
way that interactions and transactions have increased transnationally and enabled a sense of 
political and societal community around mutual identification of issues, creating a mutual 
sympathy, loyalty and a sense of “we-feeling” in communities (Adler and Barnett 1998: 7).   
Moreover, he observed that - because of transnational community formation - some states began to 
revise their understanding of security and power to that of the community. Power became 
understood in terms of the ability to defend community values, determine proper behavior of 
members and the ability of states to “be a magnet of attention” by either attracting other community 
members around a core, or attract states outside the community by convincing them that the 
community can handle their security concerns. Whereas issues of security has broadened since the 
cold war from strictly military issues to other domains including economy, environment, migration 
and social welfare (Adler and Barnett 1998: 4). 
Adler & Barnett 
Building on Deutsch’s work on pluralistic security communities, Adler and Barnett developed a 
theory of international security communities that attempts to explain the absence of interstate 
conflict since the cold war. Their main argument is that security politics today are shaped by 
international communities that fundamentally challenge main realist theoretical assumptions based 
on an international system comprised of anarchy, fixed territorial boundaries and state conflict to 
attain power and security through materialist means (Adler and Barnett 1998: 3).  
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They argue that conflictive war-prone state behavior cease to exist in security communities because 
states – when entering a security community – alter their understanding of security that increasingly 
becomes understood in terms of long-term diffuse reciprocity, self-restraint and mutual 
responsibility to promote dependable expectations of outcomes of peace, and preserve the security 
community’s existence (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31-32). 
Moreover, these security communities are not confined to territorial borders, but are instead 
understood as transnational cognitive regions that exist wherever states - and the people that reside 
within them – are able to form a transnational collective identity or community-feeling with shared 
values, mutual trust and understandings (Adler 1997: 249-253).  
While Adler and Barnett (1998) understanding of security community’s is in line with Deutsch’s 
interest in understanding international community building they position themselves as 
“constructivist path-dependent”, and argue that this approach is better at understanding the interplay 
between social actors than Deutsch’s behaviorist approach.  
Adler and Barnett define a security community as a: “transnational region comprised of sovereign 
states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ –where peaceful means 
‘neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate 
disputes” (E.Adler, P. Greve 2009: 69).   
According to Adler and Barnett their theory of security communities contribute with a new 
interpretative approach to understand security politics that includes causal explanations of how the 
interplay between state power, practices, international organizations, transactions and social 
learning can generate new forms of mutual identification and security relations (Adler & Barnett 
1998: 9).  
They state that one can differentiate between tightly-coupled and loosely-coupled pluralistic 
communities according to three factors consisting of: the depth of trust; degree of 
institutionalization of the security community governance system, and lastly whether community 
members reside in anarchy or are in a process of transformation (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30-31).  
In loosely-coupled security communities members entertain a minimal of these definitional security 
community factors that is required to maintain dependable expectation of peaceful change. The 
expectation of peace exists because members share meanings, share trust and therefore practice self-
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restraint. Tightly-coupled security communities are more complicated because they consist of: a 
mutual aid society, a collective security arrangement, and a system that can be conceived as 
something in between a community of state’s who retain sovereignty and a centralized, regional 
government that is comprised of common supranational institutions, transnational- and national 
institutions (Adler & Barnett 1998: 30).  
While tightly-coupled security communities does not render out states legal sovereignty and 
preferences, they are firstly more likely to transform the state’s role to an agent of the community in 
cases that threaten its security in terms of economic, welfare, human rights etc. (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 36-37). Secondly, states are only agents of the community so far that they act on behalf of the 
core values and the framed cognitive understandings in the community, which means that their role 
to act as community-agents is limited by the legitimacy they receive from the rest of the 
community. In both tightly-coupled and loosely-coupled security communities governance 
structures are central to ensure the dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 37). In loosely-coupled and tightly-coupled security communities members maintain: 
 Multilateralism (common decision-making in regards to conflict resolution, decision-making 
procedures),  
 Unfortified borders (border security directed towards other threats than military),  
 Change in military planning (towards joint military campaigns),  
 Common definition of threats  
 Share discourse and the language of a community.       
However, tightly-coupled communities maintain exclusive: cooperative and collective security; 
military integration; policy coordination against “internal” threats; free movement of populations; 
internationalization of authority and a multiperspectival polity (rules shared at national, 
transnational and supranational levels) (Adler & Barnett 1998: 56-58). It is clear from these points 
that EU shares the tightly-coupled characteristics, which Adler also argues (Adler 1997: 256).  
Adler and Barnett argue, in short, that security communities are formed as a result of a 3 tier 
process comprised of: Firstly, precipitating factors that encourage states to coordinate policies; 
secondly, factors that facilitate mutual trust and shared identity, and lastly “dependable expectations 
of peaceful change”, which altogether fulfilled shapes a security community (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 38).  
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1. Community formation starts with state incentives to form policy coordination do to multiple 
endogenous and indigenous factors: Including network formation, economic, technological 
or external threats to security (Adler and Barnett 1998: 38).  
2. As social interactions are increasingly embedded in international community settings around 
- organizations, international transactions, reciprocity and learning - actors and citizens 
begin to form a community feeling that separates “us” from “them”, as security increasingly 
is viewed as part of the transnational community. People’s shift of allegiance from only 
states to cognitive regions is, moreover, described as an evolutionary step that happens as 
communities become more tightly coupled and share identities. This is because security 
communities are not confined to borders or territorial sovereignty, but rather limited to the 
people’s perception of shared understanding of security and common identities (E. Adler 
1997: 250). While the community is created by social interactions, the community, in turn, 
begins to shape the structure of social interactions over time as knowledge; security and 
power perception and social interaction are increasingly embedded in international 
organizations in the community. In this way a shared identity is formed around increased 
interactions - including shared understandings and definitions of community, security, 
regional boundaries and international actions - that altogether creates mutual dependencies, 
trust, shared identity (Adler and Barnett 1998: 48).   
3. The increased cooperation and community interactions of the former two creates shared 
perceptions of mutual trust, shared identity, a feeling of mutual responsibility and most 
importantly: dependable expectations of peaceful outcomes (Adler and Barnett 1998: 38-
45). 
Section 2: Regional security governance  
 
Since Adler and Barnett wrote the theory of security communities in 1998 there has been a shift 
from explaining the formation of security communities to understand the underlying security 
mechanisms that govern a security community, which Adler and Patricia Greve (2009) responds to. 
Their main argument is that security overlaps occur in regional and security community discourse 
and practice, which shape the governance system of these communities and that security overlap is 
a “key subject” in its own right to understand regional governance systems that determines security 
politics (Adler and Greve 2009: 59-60).  
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Overlap of security mechanisms in practice: 
Overlap means that actor’s in political discourses and practice may respond to a given issue from 
two different ways of conceiving security and two different ways of perceiving regional security 
orders at the same time that can be distinguished analytically and normatively by focusing on 
regional security mechanisms of governance in practice (Adler and Greve 2009: 59-65). In other 
words, overlap means that while some actors may conceive an issue (e.g. a regional security 
development) from a balance of powers perspective, others may simultaneously view it from a 
security community perspective highlighting a coexistence (overlap) of two different 
discourses/perceptions in practice (Adler & Greve 2009: 61).  
When writing “security orders” they refer to the structural determinants of the security governance 
system that constitute security communities, which they argue one can distinguish analytically by 
focusing on security mechanisms. Security mechanisms constitute the security background 
knowledge of actors’ that derives from “a more or less clearly delineated set of rules norms, 
practices and institutions that coordinates security relations between actors in the international 
system” (Adler and Greve 2009: 65) that may reflect a repertoire of balance of power practices 
and/or security community practices of self-restraint (Adler and Greve 2009: 65-72). 
These include `balance of power´ factors as a security mechanism in practice: balancing; military 
spending; alliance formation; material capabilities and resources and/or `security community´ 
mechanisms of security governance in practice that include self-restraint; social practices; 
interaction; diplomacy; multilateral decision-making; concentric circles, collectivity; trust; 
widening of the community and changes in joint military planning (Adler and Greve 2009: 65-72 & 
p. 84). In this way, overlap implies that both balance of power security mechanisms and security 
community mechanisms can coexist in practice, and describes security overlaps as an analytical to 
distinguish the security orders of a regional governance system by analyzing security mechanisms 
in practice and discourse (Adler & Greve 2009: 61).  
Practices  
Adler and Greve define practices as inter-subjectively recognized competent performances that are: 
“knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in 
communities, routines and organization that structure experience.” (Adler & Greve 2009: 66)  
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As seen in the definition, the importance of practices lie in their constructive nature; their ability to 
construct meaning in communities and background knowledge, routines, and meaningful activity 
that are essential to sustain security communities, since such practices form meaning, learning, 
identities, knowledge, power conceptions, trust and a shared identity. This is also seen in terms of 
how Adler and Greve stress that one must take into consideration that discourses can objectify 
meaning; and that it is the broader constellation of practices that matters in relation to the broader 
security mechanisms because they have a significant community effect that can create collective 
meaning and identities (Adler & Greve 2009: 66-72). Adler and Greve state the importance of 
practices and discourses that contribute security community’s existence, but also in terms of 
indication of whether a transformation of governance structures is underway (Adler 2008: 198-199) 
(Adler 2009: 62).  
In this sense, a “regional security governance system” is understood as a system of rule that exists 
on the basis of political community discourses and security mechanism practices, agreed-upon 
political norms, practices, institutions and identities (Adler & Greve 2009: 64). They define a 
security governance system as:  
Individual and cooperate actors aiming at coordinating, managing, and regulating their collective 
existence in response to threats to their physical and ontological security.” (Adler & Greve 2009: 
64).  
A regional security governance system is thus a sort of materialization of security governance that 
can be transformed although it may remain stable that exist as a combination of overlapping 
security mechanisms practices constitutes an order-creating mechanism (Adler & Greve 2009: 65). 
While regional security governance systems may derive from balance of power and/or security 
community practices, it is important to note that both set of security mechanisms can help secure 
dependable expectations of peaceful outcomes through their practices (self-restraint and balancing 
practices) from different perspectives. While neo-realists tend to focus on balances, alliance 
formation and materialist analysis to explain the absence of war, the theoretical framework of 
security community’s regard it as a matter of self-restraint, diplomacy, cooperative security 
(interdependencies) and shared community identities (Adler & Barnett 1998: 10-11) (Adler 2008: 
204-205).  
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Three types of overlap 
To differentiate between overlaps the authors distinguish between four types: Functional, temporal 
and spatial overlap.  
Temporal/evolutionary overlap refer to overlap over time and highlight that security orders, 
institutional mechanisms, norms and ideas does not simply replace each other; they coexist. It is 
therefore not an overlap to highlight that Europe in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century was dominated by 
balance of power mechanisms that changed into security community mechanisms; one have to 
analyze whether these two forms of security mechanisms still coexist simultaneously in practice 
(Adler & Greve 2009: 73). Temporal/evolutionary overlap therefore focuses on knowledge layers of 
institutional practices (Adler & Greve 2009: 75).  
Functional variety and overlap refers to three types. First, security overlaps can vary between 
different sectors or domains such as: economic, political, cultural and social areas. Secondly, they 
can vary between state bureaucracies: balance of power mechanisms could for example be more 
dominant in practice in ministry of defense than in ministry of foreign affairs. Moreover, some 
states may have internalized balance of power or security community discourses. Third, functional 
overlap may vary across regional issues: regions may for example broaden their view of security 
functions in line with changes of geopolitical or societal developments that requires new security 
functions, which may go against “conventional” understandings of security practices (Adler & 
Greve 2009: 75-78). 
Spatial variety and overlap refer to geographical regions that have a different understanding of 
security derived from different security governance mechanisms. Overlaps could in this case be 
interregional; whether, for example, regional security community’s act in the same way externally 
as they do internally. In other words, is there an overlap between internal and external practices or 
variance? (Adler & Greve 2009: 79)  
 
Sub conclusive remarks:  
I conclude the first and section with a table that summarizes the main features of security 
communities. In line with the arguments in the introduction I have attempted to map out the 
distinctive features of the framework of security communities and structured it according to first, 
how security communities are formed and, secondly, what security practices that constitute security 
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communities in terms of “security governance (see table 1 below). In this chapter I have outlined 
the framework of security communities and argued that EU fits the characteristics of a tightly-
coupled security community constituted by a cooperative security governance system that can be 
analyzed in terms of overlap of security mechanisms in practice (self-restraint and balance of 
powers), and outlined four types of overlaps. I also distinguished how I see EU as a security 
community based on security governance, transformation of identities and how it influences non-
members. This provides the main theoretical apparatus needed for the operationalization that I shall 
now my attention to. I can now move on to describe my analysis strategy to answer my problem 
formulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis strate 
  
Table 1: The framework of security communities 
 
  
Formation of 
security 
communities:  
 
 
 
Security community 
governance: 
Securing dependable 
peaceful outcomes  
Transnational 
interactions create 
international 
communities where 
shared values, 
meanings and identities 
exist across borders. 
States integrate as a 
consequence of 
endogenous and 
indigenous factors 
including: security, 
economy, 
transactions 
(technology), 
communication that 
facilitate further 
cooperation, 
community-identity, 
mutual trust, 
reciprocity.  
As a result of increased 
social interactions - 
cooperation on 
supranational level and 
integration processes - states 
begin to see their security as 
part of a community. War 
inside the community 
becomes unimaginable, and 
a shared identity and mutual 
trust is formed that - at its 
essence – is about securing 
dependable expectations of 
peaceful outcomes.  
Security governance 
understood as 
“overlap” between 
different orders 
(multiperspectival), 
such as “balance of 
powers” and self-
restraint. In security 
communities self-
restraint is most 
evident as it is 
reflected the most 
in practice. 
Self-restraint 
(abstention from 
using force) is 
understood as the 
way security-
communities 
operate to secure 
dependable 
outcomes of 
peaceful change.  
 
EU interaction with 
neighboring countries 
understood as a way to 
secure peaceful outcomes 
through a self-restraint 
policy “disposition”. This is; 
to ensure both strategic 
interests and peaceful 
outcomes by governing 
internal- and external 
security developments by 
“integrating” other actors 
into the security community. 
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Analysis structure 
 
I start with a background chapter “EU-Turkey security cooperation” about whether Turkey’s has 
changed its foreign policy in line with security community objectives and become a security 
community agent in the Caspian region. In order to answer this I describe the main security 
cooperation of Turkey and EU in organizations and institutions, and what operations has been taken 
place to promote regional security governance since Turkey was formally accepted as a candidate in 
the European Council Helsinki summit in December 1999.   
In this respect I draw on how Adler’s understands the EU-accession process. He claims that the 
accession process takes place because EU is a security community comprised of like-minded groups 
that have a common interest in promoting self-restraint principles and cooperative security to 
neighboring countries, partnerships and outsiders. In turn for the promise of EU candidateship 
neighboring countries - such as Turkey - undertake a learning process of self-discipline and 
civilization that not only accommodates EU political conditionality requirements, but essentially 
“transforms” the identity of the neighboring country. As this process develops the neighboring 
country (Turkey) should begin to view its security in line with the EU security community and 
become a security community agent that help security EU objectives in cooperation with the 
community, thereby contributing to the promotion of dependable expectation of peaceful outcomes 
(Adler 2008: 195).  
Accordingly, in the case of Turkey, such a transformation of identity depends on whether the 
governments practices internally and externally is compatible with EU security objectives, EU  
security community practices, self-restraint and common EU standards as defined by the acquis 
communautaire (Adler 2008: 205-207) (Adler & Greve 2009: 81-82). To investigate this I have 
chosen to focus on a transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in its security 
collaboration with EU and how this is reflected in the case of regional security governance in the 
Caspian region in the first part. 
In the second part I look into the main challenges for security cooperation between Turkey and EU 
with focus on overlapping regional governance security issues in the Caspian region. This involves 
Turkey/EU security mechanism practices and competition with Russia for gas in the Caspian region 
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with a narrowed focus on the Nabucco pipeline project. In this case I am interested in the spatial 
overlap of the EU (whether it acts the same way externally as it does internally or whether the case 
reflects a variance). Lastly I discuss my findings and conclude on the problem formulation 
regarding Turkey-EU relations of regional security governance in the Caspian region. 
The main argument in this analysis is that EU’s regional security governance concerns overlap with 
security concerns of internal stability. I argue that the EU security community practices of 
negotiations, interactions, and security cooperation with Turkey is a part of a like-minded 
community strategy to promote regional governance by soft power influence on Turkey’s foreign 
policy behavior and identity. This makes sense from an EU security community perspective because 
security cooperation, as opposed to enforcing mechanisms, is the best way to ensure dependable 
outcomes because it facilitate mutual trust although it may - as I argue - slow the process of 
accession due to overlapping regional security concerns such as, for example, energy security, 
border security and internal stability.  
In this sense, the promise of Turkish membership incentivizes the government to act in line with EU 
security community objectives as a community “agent”. The way EU secures stability and peaceful 
expectations of peaceful outcomes is in this way to cooperate with Turkey to secure regional 
stability that secures EU’s energy security strategy of diversifying imports and finding cheap 
reliable suppliers (regional stability).  
 
Analysis framework:  
     
    
 
EU regional security governance cooperation 
 
EU institutions: Commission, EU 
Council, Council of ministers 
Mutual cooperation in organizations 
including: OSCE, CDSP, ECSP 
Turkey 
identity 
transformati
on into an EU 
security 
community 
agent: 
Mutual 
security 
cooperation 
with Turkey 
to promote 
regional 
security 
governance 
in the 
Caspian 
region.  
Regional security 
governance in 
Turkey’s 
neighboring 
Caspian region 
including: 
Energy/border 
security based on 
overlapping 
security 
mechanisms (self-
restraint 
diplomacy and/or 
balancing 
practices) that 
lead to 
dependable 
expectations of 
peaceful 
outcomes.   
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                Eastern EU 
          Core 
(Western States) 
                    Semi-periphery: Turkey  
              Semi-core: Eastern EU 
                       
  In the figure bellow I have tried to map out an illustration of how I see the EU security community 
as comprised of concentric circles of governance mechanism in terms of spreading EU community 
values to influence its regional neighborhood and periphery.  
 
 
              Outsiders (periphery) 
 
 
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of EU as a security community. Comprised of concentric circles rather than 
“competing centers of power”. The discursive power lies in the core’s ability to define 
community values from the core to the periphery including: appropriate behavior (self-
restraint); attract/transform identities in the Semi-periphery (neighboring countries) with the 
promise of membership and Intervention when international conflicts occur in the periphery. 
In this way the community members act as agents that preserve the community values from the 
core to the periphery. It is held together by communication, political discourses/practices, 
social interaction, governance structures, institutions and organization, mutual trust, collective 
identity etc.  
       
                                 
Core:  Western            
EU cou tries           
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Introduction 
In this analysis chapter I examine the security cooperation between EU and Turkey and identify the 
main security overlaps. A main argument is that the case of EU’s involvement in the Caspian region 
reveals overlapping security concerns between solving the energy problem (Russian dependency), 
the Turkish-EU accession and EU’s internal security. I argue these security overlaps reflect that 
Turkey has a key role for EU to overcome these overlapping security concerns, but overcoming 
such security depends on whether EU can integrate Turkey into its security community and thereby 
“govern” Turkey’s actions. In this sense, EU’s regional security governance is seen as a way of 
overcoming insecurities and secure dependability, since whatever the Turkish government choose to 
do have implications for EU’s regional security governance overlapping issues and thus also EU’s 
internal security.  
This argument has the following implications for my analysis: First we cannot view the Turkey-EU 
accession, the energy security problem, and internal security separately if we are to understand the 
EU security governance mechanisms. Second, we must analyze the security collaboration between 
EU and Turkey to understand whether their relationship constitute a security community partnership 
based on mutual trust mutual and shared identity, and especially whether Turkey can be seen as a 
community agent that practices self-restraint and promotes EU security community objectives 
before we can move on to analyze their security relations in the Caspian region. Hence, an 
evaluation of whether Turkey’s foreign policy has transformed since its formal candidateship at the 
Helsinki summit in 1999 is central to the analysis (analysis part 1).  
First, I start with an analysis of the mutual cooperation between EU and assess whether Turkey’s 
has been integrated into the EU security community, and thus assess whether Turkey can be seen to 
act as a security community agent. In order to do this I analyze the compatibility of EU and Turkey 
foreign policy in respect to goals of promoting regional security governance (energy security/border 
security/regional stability). Moreover, I analyze changes in mutual security cooperation, 
interactions in organizations and institutions, and finally assess whether a transformation of 
Turkey’s foreign policy is evident. I start with a presentation of Turkey’s foreign policy role and 
then go on to analyze security overlaps and variety in terms of temporal historical identity, 
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functional overlap of broadening security, regional/international security and other security overlaps 
in the Turkey-EU accession since the Helsinki summit in 1999, and conclude what implications this 
has for security overlaps, regional security and internal security. 
In the second part I analyse EU-Turkey’s coordinated plan to overcome obstacles of Russian energy 
competition in the Caspian region with a specific focus on the Nabucco project. The results of these 
findings are lastly put into perspective and summed up in the conclusion. 
First part: EU-Turkey security cooperation 
 
Turkey’s foreign policy at the center of international attention 
Turkey’s foreign policy is a complex matter that is inseparable from its historical identity and ties 
with neighboring regions, culture and regional communities. Its foreign policy has received an 
enormous attention in the global political environment since it is in the middle of a series of 
regional complexities of importance to regional security governance. From a western community 
perspective, Turkey is at the midst of these complexities when it comes to security community 
governance including: “Containing conflict in the Middle East; dealing with Russia; ensuring a 
stable energy supply; and defining the nature of the European Union” (Evin et al. 2010: 7). This 
assessment is supported by Davutoglu who argues that Turkey’s geographical location gives it a 
special status in international relations, since its diverse multiregional identity and regional position 
makes it capable of maneuvering in several regions at the same time (Davutoglu 2008: 78-79). 
Turkey’s foreign policy is influenced by the current membership accession process that can have 
spill-over effects on EU-Turkey energy security cooperation (Evin et al. 2010: 31). From an EU 
security community perspective the accession process has important implications since a failure 
could possibly lead to stronger ties between Russia and Turkey, which effectively could push EU 
out of regional governance influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia energy destinations (Balcer 
& Zalewski 2010: 43-44). From this perspective, I argue the decision to agree on the Turkey-EU 
accession can be seen as a consequence of functional overlap (broadening of security issues 
internal/external security overlap in regional security governance). Hence, from an EU security 
community perspective, I argue the security cooperation between EU and Turkey can be seen as a 
way to security regional governance through Turkey peace promotion in its regional neighborhood 
and the Caspian region (Evin et al. 2010: 7 & 31).  
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Temporal overlaps in Turkey’s foreign policy identity  
Throughout this section I conduct a historical background analysis of temporal security overlaps in 
Turkey’s foreign policy in order to distinguish whether Turkey has become an EU security 
community actor.  Acknowledging that the connection between Turkey’s historical background and 
implications for the EU-accession is a complex contested subject that requires a sizeable amount of 
time and space to analyze, I limit this section to analyze the historical background identity of 
Turkey, and how it relates to the EU-accession process. I argue that Turkey historically is in a 
process of identity transformation and is trying to find a place it belongs in international society.  
According to Pinar Bilgin and Ali Bilgic’s study (1959-2004) Turkey’s foreign policy has persisted 
around three binaries that represents how Turkish policy-makers throughout this period in discourse 
and practice view EU both as an inspiration and a source of anxiety: 
- EU/rope as assurance against/source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the 
international Society. 
- EU/rope as a booster of/ hindrance against Turkey’s economic development. 
- EU/rope as a community of values that is accepting/rejective of Turkey. (Bilgin, Bilgic 
2012: 111)   
They argue that these binaries highlight that Turkey’s foreign policy towards EU can be understood 
in terms of ambivalence that historically has characterized the interaction between EU policy-
makers and Turkey policy-makers and continuous to do so in terms of Turkey’s foreign policy 
discourse (Bilgin, Bilgic 2012: 111).  
They find that while economic insecurity persisted in the early years it has over the years been 
dominated by political insecurities discourses about Turkey’s place that reflects ambivalence in 
terms of the three central binaries (Bilgin, Bilgic 2012: 120-121).  
In this way they show that Turkish identity build on a coexisting temporal overlapping security 
discourse of fear of exclusion and inclusion since they imply that Turkey’s foreign security policy 
identity is shaped by two temporal discourses that coexist and shape Turkey’s foreign policy.  
According to Bilgin, the two discourses (EU anxiety/inspiration) manifest in Turkey’s foreign 
policy and coexist: EU is seen as a perceived threat/contribution to Turkey’s security interests 
determined by what Bilgin sees as a main geopolitical truth of Turkey namely vision of a strong 
Turkish unitary nation state and a strong Turkey in Europe. Moreover, she highlights a coexistence 
26 
 
of strong national and military presence in domestic politics and civilian actors that has continued to 
exist and shape Turkish policies in accordance to geopolitical reasoning (Bilgin 2007: 740 & 753).   
From this historical temporal background of coexisting incompatible (varying) identities it is clear 
that Turkey is reluctant to implement democratic reforms that are seen as a threat to common sense 
discourses of Turkey geopolitical interests (Bilgin 2007: 751-753), but also interested in the central 
benefits a membership provides to Turkey in terms of its economical inclusion in the internal 
market (önis 2008: 36-37). Hence, EU membership can be seen as a strengthening influence on 
Turkey’s soft foreign policy in its neighborhood when acting collectively with EU as opposed to 
acting alone through bilateral agreements (önis 2008: 36-37).     
Functional security overlap: Broadening of EU security issues and concerns 
Throughout this section I analyze the implications of functional security overlap as a consequence 
of a temporal broadening of security concerns since the post-cold war and what effects this has on 
Turkey-EU cooperation. 
Since the 2000s an interest in describing the broadening of security issues has been represented in 
the EU enlargement literature where wider regional governance of security concerns are seen to 
overlap with internal security in terms of different issues including border security, regional 
partnerships and energy policies with neighboring countries in the near abroad (Lavenex 2004: 681) 
(Manners 2013: 398) (Ibryamova 2004: 1-4). Lavenex imply in this way that a consequence of the 
functional broadening of security is a security overlap of internal and external security that has 
consequences for how security is perceived and governed in the EU security community and its 
regional neighborhood (Lavenex 2004: 689). In this respect she quotes the former EU High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, in regards to the European Security 
Strategy (2003): “The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU 
closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed to the East of the European 
Union (…) with whom we can enjoy close and co-operative relations.” (Solana in Lavenex 2004: 
686)   
Lavenex argues that the enlargement to the East has created new security governance concerns in 
areas such as energy security, JHA (including border management issues) that reveals how the EU 
security community has become increasingly political and economic interdependent with its 
neighboring countries. She notes that the EC in (2003) wrote that political and economic 
interdependence with EU’s neighborhood is a reality that creates increases interests in collaborating 
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to tackle transboundary threats. Moreover, the European Council (2003) requested new security 
policy strategies toward wider Europe (Lavenex 2004: 687).  
In this way, she stresses the importance of integration and extending the acquis communautaire to 
neighboring countries and thereby regulating their behavior as a way to both secure regional 
security governance and internal security in an enlarged union (Lavenex 2004: 681). In terms of 
JHA this means that EU has an interest in forming partnerships and security cooperation in terms of 
migration policy; organized crime; corruption; drug trafficking; terrorism and crisis prevention in 
wider Europe (Lavenex 2004: 689-691). Whereas in terms of energy security, the Commission 
released the Energy Security Paper (2001) where it states that the Union “suffers” from not having 
any coherent foreign policy in Southern and Eastern Europe in terms of energy matters. Whereas in 
the Commission the Directorate- General Energy and Transport in the EC further states the problem 
of Russian energy dependency:  
“If no action is taken in the next 20 to 30 year… our external energy dependence will rise to a level 
of 70% on average … this situation makes us vulnerable, particularly on account of our economic 
dependence on certain types of energy, such as oil and gas, and on particular exporting countries, 
such as Russia for natural gas and the Middle East for oil.” (Commission 2002 in Lavenex 2004: 
692) 
These examples thus highlight how interdependencies create regional EU security community 
governance incentives to deal with core EU security community trans-border concerns of terrorism; 
border security; energy security; international conflicts by promoting democratic values, 
community standards and governance in the wider neighborhood, since these concerns are seen as a 
liability to internal security.  
In this sense security can be seen as a functional spill-over of regional instability to internal security 
that, in the case of Turkey, revolves around  Turkey’s important role in terms of preventing regional 
instability to spill over to the EU security community (Diez 2005: 173). Hence, EU security 
involvement with Turkey and its neighborhood can be seen as a consequence of functional overlap 
of security issues.  
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Foreign policy change and security overlaps in the Turkey-EU accession  
In this section I argue that the orientation Turkey foreign policy takes is dependent on the Turkey-
EU accession that can have significant implications both for Turkey’s foreign policy identity if it 
becomes part of the tight-coupled EU security community, but also for EU since its security 
governance in Turkey’s neighborhood depends on whether it can influence Turkey’s foreign policy, 
and thereby maintain peace and regional stability in its neighborhood.  
According to Rémi Piet the link between EU’s external energy policy and the Turkey-EU accession 
is clear. His argument is based on the observation that Turkey is involved in “Trans European 
Energy Networks” that are essential to EU’s overall energy security policy strategy. Accordingly, 
Turkey is involved with Trans European Energy Networks such as: the Caspian region NG3 
pipeline from Caspian and Middle East to Europe, the Nabucco project and the NG6-East 
Mediterranean gas link that aims to provide a gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea, the Middle East, 
and Southern Mediterranean countries to Europe through Turkey and Greece (Piet et al. 2012: 243-
244). Moreover, Turkey’s central importance for EU’s energy security strategy is also evidently 
expressed by EC president Barroso in 2009: “energy security is one of the cases where we can show 
to the EU public opinion how important Turkey is for the EU” (Piet et al. 2012: 244). Hence, he 
implies that there is no difference between the Turkish-EU accession and an underlying energy 
security motive.   
This is confirmed by Balcer and Zalewski. They claim that Turkish-EU accession is of vital 
importance to EU’s regional governance security because of its geopolitical locations and its 
relations with Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia energy destinations. They argue that if 
Turkey-EU accession negotiations fail then there is a strong risk that Turkey’s foreign policy will 
work against EU interests in the area, and possibly cooperate with Russia instead, which is a central 
concern for EU and especially the EU-10 that have strong interests to overcome Russian gas 
monopoly (Balcer, Adam & Zalewski, Piotr 2010: 43-44). 
According to Triantaphyllou and Foutiou, Turkey’s foreign policy is directed towards increasing its 
attractiveness (and influence) to the EU. In this respect, Triantaphyllou and Foutiou finds that 
Turkey’s foreign policy aim is to allure EU to the potential benefit it can have for its regional 
security governance concerns; namely the influence Turkey have on neighboring regions and in 
terms of helping EU’s energy security problem by fulfilling an “energy hub role” in the Caspian 
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basin, which they argue is compatible with EU security interests. Thus, they imply that Turkey 
clearly is aware of its energy potential to influence EU-accession outcomes and other areas of 
security cooperation with EU.  
Hence, These 5 authors highlight energy security as a driving motive of EU-accession and as a 
driving motive to integrate Turkey into the EU security community as a way to govern its own 
internal security.  
Triantaphyllou and Foutiou analysis also notes that Turkey – like the EU - relies mainly on gas 
imports from Russia, and that Gazprom (Russia’s energy giant) has already signed contracts with 
Turkey’s Aksa Energy (due to a Turkish liberalization of the energy market in the EU-accession 
process) for an import increase of Russian gas and is engaged in further negotiations 
(Triantaphyllou and Foutiou 2010: 56).  Moreover, according to Triantaphyllou and Foutiou EU has 
affected Turkey’s foreign policy through a soft cooperative power influence that has changed 
Turkey’s foreign policy since more agents are involved in its making that has had “serious” 
implications for its policy making in terms of, for example, its gas pipeline diplomacy and aim to be 
an energy hub with the EU (Triantaphyllou & Foutiou 2010: 55-56). 
In this sense, the independence of Turkey’s foreign policy is seen as a threat to EU security 
governance interests that led Evin et al. (2010) to claim that the recent independency of Turkey’s 
foreign policy is a danger to EU and US interests, since their influence in Turkey’s neighborhood 
thereby diminish Western influence in the area as a consequence of “losing” Turkey to Russia based 
on an understanding Turkish’s foreign policy and identity is shaped by collaboration (Evin et al. 
2010: 7-8).  The fears revolve around the fact that Turkey is 75-80 percent dependent on gas from 
Russia and conducts energy and conduct other agreements with Russia that historically has 
influenced its foreign policy, as the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, stated in response to US 
pressure on Turkey to provide help to Georgia following the Russian invasion in 2008: “Any other 
European country can follow a certain isolationist policy against Russia. Can Turkey do this? I ask 
you to understand the geographical conditions of Turkey… Unfortunately we have to admit this 
fact. Turkey is almost 75-80 percent dependent on Russia [for energy]. We do not want to see a 
Russian American or Russian-NATO confrontation” (Evin et al. 2010: 15).     
Hence, it is clear that EU-accession has driving motive to control Turkey’s foreign policy since 
EU’s governance in Turkey’s neighborhood depends on whether it can make Turkey act as a 
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security community agent since if the EU-accession breaks down it could have a negative effect on 
other areas including regional governance of border security and energy security agreements. This 
reflects a security overlap of the promotion of regional security and internal security/EU-accession, 
but also an overlap between an EU security driving motives of hard balancing security practices 
(limiting Russian influence on Turkey, energy security) through security community mechanisms 
practices (engaging with Turkey diplomacy, EU-accession, influence Turkey’s foreign policy). 
 
Turkey security cooperation as seen from an EU security community perspective 
In this section I claim that the EU-accession process has affected how Turkey conducts its foreign 
policy. I base this argument on Turkey’s participation in EU security organizations.  
I argue that Turkish energy involvement with EU reveals a sort of long-term determination to 
become free of Russian energy dependency by become an energy hub and economically integrate 
with EU.  
My argument is supported by a key EC report on the “issues arising from Turkey’s membership 
perspective”, which states that Turkey’s access to its neighboring regions, including the South 
Caucasus; Mediterranean; Middle East and Central Asia are of vital interest to EU energy security 
and border security concerns (Commission 2004: 4-12). The paper claims that regional security 
cooperation with Turkey is essential to EU’s internal stability (enhanced cooperation to fight 
organized crime, terrorism, illegal migration, conflict prevention), and that Turkey accession and 
security cooperation would help EU energy security problems, especially related to the south 
Caucasus-Caspian region and regional security governance: 
“Through Turkey the EU could have a stabilizing influence in Southern Caucasus, provided that 
Turkey is willing to try to solve conflicts with its neighbours already before its accession.” 
(Commission 2004: 8).  
In this paper the Commission clearly takes a position that favours closer security cooperation and 
integration with Turkey since it argues that - if closer security cooperation with Turkey can be 
achieved - then EU’s regional security governance influence in the region could be significantly 
improved through Turkey. This quote thus reveals that EU has a clear interest in to extend its 
security community regional governance through Turkey and thus control its foreign policy actions 
with its neighbourhood. It is indeed a main point of the Commission document (2005) that EU 
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would benefit from Turkey’s diplomatic ties in the region and peace promotion in EU’s wider 
neighbourhood. In this sense, Turkey’s contribution to EU’s security is seen in terms of its practices 
where security cooperation, partnerships in organizations and integration with EU goes hand in 
hand with EU’s security objectives of extending its regional security governance influence in 
Turkey’s neighbourhood that promotes dependable outcomes of peace. Thereby revealing a security 
overlap between security cooperation in regional organizations and EU internal security:  
 
“[Turkey] Through its integration in the western alliance, and membership of many economic and 
regional organisations, it contributes to the security of Europe and itsneighbourhood.” 
(Commission 2005: 6)  
 
This is, moreover, confirmed by Evin et al. since they argue that Turkey in many ways can be seen 
as doing EU’s neighborhood policy for the EU, implying that the EU security community through 
Turkey is increasingly seen as a security community actor that helps secure EU security concerns 
(Evin et al 2010: 31). This is also confirmed by Thomas Diez who argues that since the Helsinki 
summit in 1999 it has become increasingly problematic to see Turkey as an insulator outside the EU 
security complex because such an account neglects the desecuritizing practices, including the 
external and internal actions and the integration processes, which has occurred since Turkish EU-
candidateship (Diez 2004: 174).  
In terms of Turkey’s foreign policy alignment with the EU and security cooperation, Turkey is 
strongly present in EU security operations and is a formal member in organizations and institutions 
including the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO, but it remains outside the CSFP and ESDP 
until the accession process is finished and has not aligned sufficient with EU’s foreign security 
policy similar to other accession countries, since the Commission argues it can prove an alignment 
with EU foreign policy in areas vital to its interests in its surrounding regional neighborhood, 
including human rights and the Caucasus (Commission 2005: 10-11). Here, notably, alignment with 
CFSP is a requirement in terms of membership negotiations (Diez 2005: 173).  
In this sense, security cooperation can help overcome instability in Turkey’s neighbouring regions 
including the Caspian-Caucasus region through tighter cooperation in areas such as; visa border 
management controls with Turkey and energy dependency, since Turkey has a close proximity to 
some of the energy-rich regions on the planet and has a potential to make a “serious contribution” to 
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EU security concerns including energy security, border management and terrorism (Commission 
11-12).  
Summing up: 
Throughout this first analysis part I have assessed whether a transformation of Turkey’s foreign 
policy security objectives could be observed, and whether this is reflected in terms of security 
overlaps in its historical background identity; EU-accession process and EU-Turkey security 
cooperation. This has been done by distinguished security overlaps that both support/complicate the 
process of integrating Turkey into the EU security community.  
I have argued that regional security governance significantly affects the accession process and 
Turkey’s foreign policy identity that can be seen in relation to EU’s strong security community 
motive to integrating Turkey into the security community as an agent that helps secure EU security 
community objectives in the Caucasus region. It reflects an ambition from the EU community – 
lead by the Commission - to incentivize (or softly influence) Turkey through diplomatic means in 
order to promote EU security objectives of regional security governance, which can also be seen as 
a power balancing security mechanisms to keep Russian influence on Turkey’s foreign policy to a 
minimum. Moreover, Turkey’s long participation in EU and western security organizations and 
incentives to become a security community member, especially in relations to its determination to 
become an energy hub, highlight that it sees EU energy objectives of overcoming Russian energy 
dependency as congruent with its own interests. This argument is based on the Turkey’s historical 
foreign policy identity and orientation towards Europe; its diplomatic ties with EU in terms of the 
EU-accession and due to the fact that it is involved in multiple security cooperation’s with EU 
including organizations, EU institutions, partnerships, common projects in its neighborhood and 
cooperating to overcome regional security concerns such as a coherent energy policy. This process 
of integration is, however, slowed by a complex mixture of aforementioned factors.  
The partnership and strategic relationship appears to be mutual beneficial: While Turkey is drawn to 
the promise of EU-membership in terms of the security, economic and cultural benefits, the EU 
security community EU, in turn, influences the negotiations and creates incentives for Turkey to 
transform its identity (Adler 2008: 207). Accordingly, EU has a strong influence to influence 
Turkey’s foreign policy identity in terms of socializing effects or persuasion; engagement in 
partnership building in cooperative multilateral institutions, dialogues and in collaborative 
promotion of regional identities; shared knowledge and security cooperation that altogether 
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facilitates security governance and thus dependable expectations of peaceful outcomes (Adler 2008: 
204 & 207 & 223).  
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Analysis part two 
The Nabucco project 
Introduction 
Throughout this second part of the analysis I analyze the EU-Turkey security cooperation in terms 
of the Nabucco project. The purpose of this analysis is to uncover the regional governance security 
determinants in the security cooperation between EU and Turkey in its neighborhood.  
In this case study I analyze the main challenges and opportunities of the EU-Turkey security 
cooperation in terms of EU hopes of diversifying energy, and Turkey’s objective of becoming an 
energy hub. Based on this analysis it is argued that the selected case study both represent hopes and 
challenges in terms of mutual energy security cooperation between Turkey and EU, since they both 
a lot to gain from it that could spill over to other areas including the EU-accession (Barysch 2010: 
9). However, this case study also show that this security cooperation faces a complex series of 
overlapping regional security challenges including for example: EU concerns of Turkey’s key 
geopolitical location and bargaining position in terms of the EU-accession, but also Russia’s great 
influence and determination to keep its central gas monopoly and influence in the Caspian region. A 
main challenge is the uncertainties involved in the Nabucco project and the lack of political 
backing, which partly reflects that big countries such as Germany and France have not supported 
the project openly as opposed to Central and Eastern European countries (Barysch 2010: 5 & 17).  
This indicates a lack of a coherent foreign policy determination in terms of energy security, and also 
that EU, as Finon observes, is having a hard time competing with Russia on balance of power 
security policy issues including energy security (Finon 2010: 49-50 & 63-65). In contrast to Finon 
who concludes that the Nabucco project likely will fail based on a competitive analysis between 
Russia and EU, I suggest that comparing EU-Russia energy security in competitive terms misses the 
point about how EU practices security and regional governance. I argue that EU security 
community governance power (including Turkey as a security community agent) lies in the slow 
diplomatic relations and partnerships, which, in opposition to Russia, relies on a non-
confrontational soft foreign policy approach and the promotion of EU security principles of self-
restraint from the EU core to its neighborhood and periphery. Self-restraint is also important in 
terms of energy security since it helps developing diplomatic relations and peaceful conflict 
35 
 
settlements that are an important strategy when “bridging” pipelines through energy suppliers and 
transit countries to Europe. In other words, I argue that one cannot limit EU’s energy strategy to 
hard competitive security policy elements since EU, unlike Russia, arguably does not rely as much 
on balance of power practices and hard influence in in its wider neighborhood. In this sense my 
argument is built on a theoretical understanding that spatial regional security variety: That EU 
perceptions of security (and practices) differ from Russia. EU security practices are much better 
understood in terms of non-confrontation with Russia and security cooperation in organizations and 
diplomacy in its wider neighborhood to secure peaceful outcomes step by step.  
 
The historical background: What is the Nabucco project? 
The Nabucco project was first developed in 2002. It is considered the main EU  response to Russian 
gas dependency that has been set in motion, and the main project to help EU energy security in 
terms of diversifying its energy supplies (Barysch 2010: 3). The plan is to build a pipeline from 
Caspian region and Central Asian destinations that extends 3300 km and goes from Turkey’s 
Eastern through Bulgaria; Romania; Hungary and into Austria. At its full capacity it is expected to 
supply EU with 31 bcm gas per year (Erdogdu 2010: 2).  
The Nabucco project is a gas pipeline project comprised of major gas companies in Turkey, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania  that has yet to be concluded (Erdogdu 2010: 2). This is due to the 
complexities involved in long-term gas pipeline projects about uncertainties, risk awareness and 
expected return of profits where a lot of intervening factors can be of concern including: long-term 
contracts, funding (the Nabucco pipeline project amounts to approximately 8 billion euros), regional 
instability, demand-supplier reliability and political and economic support (Finon 2010: 56). In 
terms of the Nabucco project the main uncertain question is: where the gas is going to come from? 
(Barysch 2010: 10)   
The Russian South Stream project is perceived a main challenge to the Nabucco project. The South 
Stream plan was first developed in 2007 by the Russian state-owned gas exporting giant Gazprom 
in an attempt to discourage the Nabucco project (Socor 2008: 2). The South Stream plan is to 
extend a gas pipeline that extends 800 km from Russia under the Black Sea into Bulgaria and 
crosses to a north path (Hungary, Austria) and a south path (Through Greece, Serbia, Slovenia and 
reaches Italy at its final destination). Initially it was intended to supply 30 bcm a year in 2007; 
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however, since the Ukranian-Russian gas crisis in 2009 this has increased to 63 bcm a year (Finon 
2011: 52-55).  
Gazprom has attempted to extend its influence in the Caspian region through bilateral gas importing 
agreements with countries such as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, which gas it then can transport 
through Russian territory to EU through the South Stream (Finon 2011: 53) (Triantaphyllou Fotiou 
2010: 57). Moreover, Gazprom has successfully incorporated some of EU’s major gas company in 
the project (the Italian gas giant ENI and one of UK’s largest gas companies EDF) to help fund and 
build the South Stream. Russia’s power balancing practices reflect in this way a confrontational 
determination to undermine the Nabucco project and maintain Russian gas dominance in the 
Caspian-South Caucasus region by fragmenting the coherency of the Nabucco project through 
bilateral gas agreements with involved countries, gas companies and developing a competing South 
Stream project to keep EU and Turkey from fulfilling a unified energy security strategy. 
Recently the Nabucco was announced dead June 26 2013 since it had been outcompeted by TAP (a 
competing pipeline project). These two gas-company projects were competing to get permission 
from Azerbaijan and Turkey to extract gas from Shah Deniz field II in Azerbaijan to EU 
(Euractiv.com) (Sobjak & Zasztowt 2012: 1-2). However, since then talks has surfaced again that 
the Nabucco project is due to “rise again” as energy expert Alexander Jackson 
(Naturalgaseurope.com) (Azernews.az) observes, which might be the case since EU energy 
Commissioner, Guenter Oettinger,  on the fifth of July 2003 stated in a newspaper column:  
“This is just the beginning. The decision to build TAP and later to deliver more gas also means that 
the supply path to Austria - Nabucco West at the moment - is still in the conversation.” 
(Hurriyetdailynews.com) 
EU-Turkey response to these challenges and overlapping security concerns 
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou and Eleni Fotiou claim that Turkey’s soft foreign policy reflects that it is 
attempting to use the Nabucco project to engage in energy diplomacy with EU since it thereby can 
gain “an advantageous bargaining position” in the EU-accession negotiations through its key 
geopolitical location (Triantaphyllou Fotiou 2010: 56-57). They point out that Turkey in the past 
put pressure on EU and demanded a right to use 15 % of Nabucco’s gas for own use at a cheaper 
price and, moreover, asked EU for compensation in the EU-accession and “special conditions” such 
as the opening of the energy chapter whereby Turkey could avoid implementing reforms in terms of 
freedom of speech and the Cyprus issue. EU has so far has refused to do. According to Dimitrios 
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Triantaphyllou and Eleni Fotiou the main question is whether Turkey sees the negotiations as an 
opportunity to become energy independent from Russia (thereby from a security perspective) or 
whether Turkey is attempting to become a strong regional power because this will have important 
implications for the future of Turkey-EU relations (Triantaphyllou Fotiou 2010: 60). 
Although I agree with Triantaphyllou and Foutiou that Turkey has a favorable geopolitical location, 
benefitting its bargaining position in its pipeline diplomacy with EU, I argue that such a focus 
downgrades the bigger picture: Namely that both EU and Turkey are mutual dependent in this case 
and have similar security interests in overcoming Russian energy dependency. Indeed, since Turkey 
imports about 60 % gas from Gazprom its main security interests is to reduce its energy dependency 
(Barysch 2007: 2) which,  if unresolved, would lead to a greater Turkish dependency on Russian 
gas and a loss billions of dollars investment in transit revenues in the process and employment in 
the 2000 km Nabucco gas pipeline (Erdogdu 2010: 26). Thus, although Turkey has a key 
geopolitical location, EU has a bargaining momentum in other areas including the Turkey-EU 
accession, but also holds Turkey’s key to overcome Russian energy dependency. Moreover, due to 
the many uncertainties regarding the Nabucco project as a whole, I argue that it is likely that Turkey 
will not play “its energy security card” since it in the past has had undermining consequences for 
the Nabucco project (Erdogdu 2010: 26), although I acknowledge that such bargaining 
opportunities may surface again if the Nabucco project returns to a “safer investment ground”, and 
that may be a problem for EU energy security since it would then be dependent on gas imports from 
Turkey (or Russia). 
Sub conclusive remarks 
All in all there seems to be a lot of controversies going on and complex simultaneous security 
overlaps, varieties, motives and uncertainties between many actors involved in the Nabucco project 
including: state actors, competing gas companies in pipeline projects and EU officials. Much 
depends on whether EU and Turkey’s diplomatically can come to an agreement, since a main part 
of the problem in the case of the Nabucco project seems to be one of “mutual trust” and reassurance 
between the two. This trust has, for example, been damaged by incompatible interest between 
Turkey’s interest in using energy in the EU-accession negotiations, which has created uncertainties 
and more overlapping security concerns. 
From an EU perspective it is important to treat Turkey as an equal partner in the EU accession, 
since this indeed is a point of controversy since EU has extended the energy community treaty to 
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countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, but not done the same in the Turkish case (Barysch 2007: 
6-7). From Turkey’s perspective, EU-security cooperation to overcome energy security depends on 
both its ability to persuade and allure big EU countries to its energy potential, and its ability to 
reassure EU that it is not going to exploit its advantageous geopolitical to energy security and 
cooperate in long-term mutual benefits (Erdogan 2012: 26-28). This has for example led Erdogan to 
conclude that if Turkey, EU, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and other countries do not cooperate in 
the long-term then these countries and others will most likely not be able to overcome Russian 
energy dependency (Erdogan 2012: 28).  
The security cooperation appear to be deeply affected by multiple simultaneous security 
overlapping concerns at once including the mistrust/trust relations between EU and Turkey in the 
EU-accession, energy diplomacy in terms of the Nabucco project and regional security governance 
in the region. This indicates that, although both have a clear mutual interest to cooperate in terms of 
energy security, they are both unable to make a coherent stand due to the many complex 
overlapping regional security concerns and overlapping disputes in other areas including: EU-
accession talks, energy security cooperation, regional partnerships that seems to create uncertainty 
on both sides about intensions, strategy and a lack of mutual trust in terms of their security 
cooperation. This would seem to be a hindrance to combined objectives of securing mutual interests 
in energy security that creates a back and forth long-term diplomacy situation, which illustrates the 
slow process of integrating Turkey into the EU security community.  
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Putting security-cooperation into perspective  
 
Since the analysis have focused mainly on different (smaller) perspectives of overlapping 
mechanisms of Turkey-EU security cooperation this section will wrap up these perspectives in 
context with the bigger picture and arguments. What is this project about? What is the context - and 
how is it related to the arguments in the analysis? 
The main interest of this project has been to understand how the EU security community operates in 
practice by examining how security is governed in a regional context. To do this I have selected the 
EU-Turkey security cooperation as a case and focused on the relation between regional governance 
mechanisms (overlapping security governance practices) and issues (border security and energy 
security).  
All my arguments in the analysis should be understood in this context: As smaller empirical 
arguments that add up to the bigger constellation of discourses and practices that constitute the EU 
security community governance system, which main function is to secure dependable expectations 
of peaceful outcomes in the community. 
How is security governed in a security community governance system?  
- My analysis illustrates that the EU security operates through facilitating dependable 
expectations by spreading its security community values (primary self-restraint) with 
patience to its regional neighborhood through diplomacy. In the EU-Turkey security 
cooperation case this was mainly done by integrating Turkey into the EU security 
community comprised of: Institutions, organizations, regional partnership projects, EU-
accession and the Nabucco project so that Turkey, in turn, would help promote EU security 
objectives in its regional neighborhood of peace promotion and energy security (In this 
sense the EU security governs through agents). This is done in the prospect that Turkey’s 
foreign policy interest over time will overlap with the EU security community as it 
consistently integrates itself into the community, align with its policies and interacts with 
the community in diplomatic relations and learn community values. 
- A main finding in this case is the magnetizing influence on candidate countries in the 
prospect of perceived security, economic and cultural benefits. In the case of Turkey this 
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helped create a better diplomatic bargaining position and alignment with EU’s security 
objectives. Moreover, it also provided EU with a bargaining position towards Turkey’s 
otherwise advantageous energy geopolitical location (since EU is Turkey’s main trade 
partner and both had mutual compatible interest in energy security cooperation). Moreover, 
the accession incentivized Turkey to reform its external and internal policy to one that is 
compatible with EU security community values. An important finding in this case was that 
the Turkey-EU accession could be understood as a multiperspectival case of regional 
security governance in terms of energy security as a driving motive (Turkey energy hub) and 
border stability and regional instability as a barrier. Moreover, it could also be understood as 
a balancing move to secure that EU could continue to entertain its governance in Turkey’s 
regional neighborhood and as a security balancing practice to keep Russian influence out. 
- Challenges in the Nabucco project were handled through a non-confrontational approach to 
Russian attempts to sabotage the project. Instead of openly competing with Russia, EU 
attempts to diversify its energy imports relies on soft foreign policy community influence, 
partnership building, and influence through Turkey’s relations in its energy-rich regional 
neighborhood, and diplomatic relations with potential suppliers.  
From a community perspective the non-confrontational approach makes sense since EU is 
comprised of several Member States bureaucrats and Parliament, security organizations and 
so forth who constantly interact, compromise and find common diplomatic solutions to 
problems in different forums (and different levels) that stands in opposition to a strong 
Russian government with that arguably relies on a more geopolitical balancing practices 
given the actions of the state-owned Gazprom and bilateral relations of the government and 
its invasion and role in the Ukranian Central East  European gas crisis. 
- Lastly an essential finding necessary to understand the EU security community governance 
and security cooperation with Turkey was the overlap of regional /internal security as a 
result of a functional overlap (broadening of security concerns) in a new world order. This 
was necessary to understand concerns of energy security and border security; since EU’s 
internal stability relies on regional governance in terms of these. The security overlaps 
provided a tool to understand the implications of these, and how the EU security community 
“secures” dependable expectations of peaceful outcomes that both helped providing an 
analytical framework for how “security” was understood in a multiperspectival context and 
how regional security was practiced. 
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Conclusion:  
 
Throughout this project I have analyzed how the EU security community operates in its regional 
neighborhood to secure dependable outcomes of peaceful change, and chosen the Turkish-EU 
security cooperation as a case. From a problem-oriented perspective I have focused on the EU 
security dilemmas in terms of the EU-Turkey security cooperation in the Caspian region and 
conducted a case study on the Nabucco gas pipeline project.  
I conclude that an essential way the EU security community operates to secure dependable 
expectations of peaceful outcomes is by integrating Turkey into the EU security community in 
security cooperative organizations, institutions, neighborhood projects and EU-accession diplomacy 
that renders it able to influence Turkey’s internal and external practices in line with EU security 
community objectives and values. In this way, the EU security community has allured Turkey to the 
potential benefits of a possible EU membership and the prospects of economic gain in terms of 
energy security diplomacy. This has proven crucial for the EU security community to handle 
overlapping security threats of border security and energy security, since EU through Turkey has 
gained access to some of the most energy-rich suppliers on the planet, and also through Turkey 
gained an influence in the Caspian region to promote peace, possible partnerships and energy 
diplomacy.  
However, although Turkey is increasingly integrated into the security community there are still a lot 
of challenges that persist, which have proven troublesome for EU and Turkey goals of overcoming 
Russian gas dependency. This is clearly seen in the Nabucco gas pipeline project where 
uncertainties persist both in terms of the projects success, but also in terms of energy negotiations 
between EU and Turkey, which have created concerns and mistrust on both sides. This has mainly 
been a problem in terms of overlapping security concerns in the EU-accession and energy 
negotiations that have created problems for both partners who have expressed fears and unfair 
treatment. From an EU security community perspective officials have expressed a fear that Turkey 
will use its advantageous geopolitical location to bargain for special conditions in the current 
Turkish accession into the EU. On the other hand, Turkey has voiced a general mistrust in the equal 
treatment of accession countries. However, I conclude that this may not be as troublesome as it 
would seem since such things are to be expected in negotiations, and also because both partners are 
still committed to the objective of energy security cooperation.     
42 
 
Hence, there is some room for some optimism in the near future since Turkey and EU is still 
negotiating and security-cooperating to secure peaceful outcomes in the Caspian Region, where 
Turkey’s diplomatic ties to its neighboring countries can prove crucial in terms of finding gas 
suppliers. However, much depends on the political backing and funding of such projects, and 
whether EU and Turkey can find common grounds to overcome the troublesome Russian gas 
dependency, differentiating interests and overlapping security concerns in terms of regional 
complexes.  
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